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We introduce a new measure of the extent of federal regulation in the U.S. and use it to
investigate the relationship between federal regulation and macroeconomic performance.  We 
find that regulation has statistically and economically significant effects on aggregate output and
the factors that produce it - total factor productivity, physical capital, and labor.  The effects are
multifaceted and complex.  Regulation changes the way output is produced by changing the mix
of inputs.  It also affects both the trends and deviations about the trends in output and its factors
of production, and the effects differ across dependent variables.  The effects display interesting
intertemporal dynamics.  Changes in regulation and marginal tax rates offer an explanation for
the productivity slowdown of the 1970s.  Regulation also has substantial opportunity costs in the
form of foregone output.
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1Some empirical work studies regulatory effects related to macroeconomic concerns.  Nicoletti
and Scarpetta (2003), using OECD data, find that product regulation that creates barriers to entry
reduces industry-level multifactor productivity growth; Alesina et al. (2003) find that such
regulation reduces industrial investment.  Purely microeconomic investigations of the cost of
regulation have been around for some time.  See Goff (1996) for an extensive review of the
literature to the mid-1990s.  Some kinds of government activity, such as import quotas, are an
economic intervention similar in nature to regulation, and their economic impact has been
studied extensively.  Quotas do not seem to be what people mean by the term “regulation,”
though, and they certainly are not included in the Code of Federal Regulations.
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1. Introduction
Macroeconomists often divide government economic activity into four broad classes:
purchases, taxation, deficits, and monetary policy.  There is, however, a fifth class that has been
almost completely ignored in both the theoretical and empirical macroeconomic literature,
namely, regulation.  Although microeconomists have joined politicians and pressure groups in
debating the effects and desirability of regulation, macroeconomists have devoted almost no
attention to the impact of regulation on the aggregate economy.  Indeed, the only exceptions of
which we are aware are Blanchard and Giavazzi's (2003) theoretical study of the
macroeconomic effects of product and labor market regulations, Goff's (1996) pioneering and
apparently overlooked empirical study, and a small group of empirical papers by economists at
the World Bank (Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999 and 2002 ; Forteza and Rama,
2003; Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2003) that study the ability of the extent of government
intervention in the economy (including regulation), perceived government effectiveness, and
market rigidities to explain cross-country differences in per capita income and growth rates.
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In this paper, we present a new time series measure of the extent of United States federal
regulation over fifty years.  Our measure is the number of pages in the Code of Federal
Regulations (hereafter, CFR), the US government publication that prints all federal regulations in2These studies have proposed page counts as a measure of regulation.  Friedman and
Friedman (1979) use the number of pages in the Federal Register to measure the growth of
regulation.  Becker and Mulligan (1999) use pages in the U.S. Code as a measure of growth in
the size of government.  Mulligan and Shleifer (2003) use kilobytes of unannotated state law,
where 1kb approximately equals one printed page, to study the causes of regulation.  As we
explain in the Appendix, the CFR is the most appropriate source for measuring federal
regulation.  Goff (1996) uses factor analysis to construct a clever composite measure of
regulation.  It spans almost as long a period as ours, and it attempts to capture elements of
enforcement vigor, which are absent from our measure.  Its main limitation is that, being a factor
analysis construct, its meaning is unclear.
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existence during a given year.  Any such measure has limitations, of course (e.g., it cannot
capture the vigor of enforcement), but it is reasonable to believe that the number of pages of
printed regulations is an indicator of the extent of regulation.  Federal law requires that all
federal regulations be printed in the CFR; if there were no regulations reported in the CFR, there
would be no federal regulation, suggesting a positive correlation between the CFR page count
and the amount of regulation.  Moreover, if our measure lacked content, one would expect it to
show no relation to other variables such as output or total factor productivity.  In fact, we find
very strong relations with turning points in regulation corresponding to turning points in the
dependent variables, suggesting that our measure is capturing what we hope it captures.  A few
researchers have proposed measures similar to ours; see Friedman and Friedman (1979), Becker
and Mulligan (1999), and Mulligan and Shleifer (2003).
2  Our measure is more comprehensive
and covers a much longer time span than these alternatives.
We use our series to examine regulation's effect on output, total factor productivity
(TFP), labor services, capital services, and private investment.  Regulation grows almost all the
time, but there is great variation in the growth rate.  That variation allows us to perform tests of
the relation between regulation and the other variables.  We begin with Granger-causality, in the
spirit of Hamilton's (1983) study of oil and the macroeconomy.  We find unidirectional Granger-3
causality from regulation to the macro variables.  We then estimate reduced-form regressions to
explore in more detail the impact of regulation on aggregate economic activity.  Regulation
added over the last fifty years has reduced aggregate output substantially, both by shifting the
level of output down and by reducing output's trend rate of growth.  The reduction has varied
over time but by the end of our sample has resulted in a net reduction of about ten percent, so
that annual output now (about $11 trillion) is about ninety percent of what it would have been
(about $12 trillion) if there had been no additions to federal regulation over the past fifty years
(the length of our sample).  That means the federal regulation added over the past half century
now costs the US economy $1 trillion each year in foregone output.  To put it at a more personal
level, the current annual loss of income is about $10,000 per household or $3,600 per person. 
Alternatively, each page of regulation in the CFR now costs the economy about $9.2 million in
foregone output.  As of 2000, these numbers were growing (in real terms) at a rate of about two-
tenths of a percent per year.  In addition, regulation affects the dynamic adjustment paths of all
variables in complicated ways; for all variables, the effect of a change in regulation is spread
over time.  The effects differ for output, TFP, and the factors of production, implying that
regulation alters the allocation of resources.  The effect of regulation on TFP is especially
noteworthy.  We find that increases in regulation, together with changes in marginal tax rates,
explain the TFP slowdown of the 1970s.
2. The Code of Federal Regulations and Measures of Federal Regulation
We begin with a brief description of the Code of Federal Regulations and the measure of
regulation that we extract from it.  A more complete discussion is in the Appendix.4
The CFR was first published in 1938.  It was divided into 50 “titles,” each of which
pertains to a major division of regulation, such as agriculture, banking, environment, labor, and
shipping.  The structure of 50 titles continues to this day.  The next complete edition of the CFR
was published in 1949.  Between 1938 and 1949, annual supplements to the CFR were
published, listing changes in regulations.  Because of the way the annual supplements were done,
it is difficult to use them to update the 1938 edition of the CFR to obtain annual page counts. 
After 1949, the annual supplements were replaced by pocket supplements, which were done
differently than the annual supplements; also, updated versions of entire titles were published
increasingly often.  The pocket supplements together with the intermittent revised titles make it
possible to construct fairly accurate annual page counts for the CFR between 1949 and 1969. 
See the Appendix for details on the method of construction.  Starting in 1969, the complete CFR
has been published annually, so annual page counts can be obtained directly.
Figure 1 shows time series for the total page count of the CFR from 1949 to 1999. 
Regulation grows almost all the time, but its growth rate varies a great deal.  Periods of negative
growth are infrequent, and, when  negative, the magnitude of the growth rate always is small. 
By far, the fastest growth occurs in the early 1950s.  High growth also occurs in the 1970s, even
though that period saw important deregulation in transportation, telecommunications, and
energy. Clearly, any deregulation that did occur in those industries is more than offset by
increased regulation in other areas, as Hopkins (1991) has noted.  The behavior of the regulatory
series is equally interesting during the 1980s, when the Reagan administration promoted
deregulation as a national priority.  Although the growth in the number of pages in the CFR
slows in the early and late 1980s, a decrease in total pages occurs only in one year, 1985.  The5
1990s witnessed the largest reduction in pages of regulation in the history of the CFR, when
three consecutive years of decline are recorded.  This coincides with the Clinton administration’s
“reinventing government” initiative which boasted of reduced regulation in general and a
reduction in the number of pages in the CFR in particular.  There thus are several major
segments in regulation's time path, with corresponding breaks in trend (dates are approximate):
(1) 1949 to 1960 (fast growth), (2) 1960 to 1972 (slow growth), (3) 1972 to 1981 (fast growth),
(4) 1981 to 1985 (slightly negative to slow growth), (5) 1985 to 1993 (fast growth), and (6) 1993
to 1999 (negative to approximately zero growth).  As we will see, these segments line up with
some interesting behavior of aggregate variables of interest.
3. Estimation
We now examine the relation between regulation and macroeconomic performance.  We
begin with a discussion of the variables to be examined and the data measuring them; we then
turn to Granger causality tests; we end with an examination of two reduced-form regression
models.
3.1. Variables To Be Examined
We want to study the effect that federal regulation has on macroeconomic activity.  The
obvious macroeconomic variable to examine is real aggregate output.  However, regulation
presumably affects the economy in complex ways.  It therefore seems worthwhile to examine
how regulation affects not just output but also the determinants of output.  If we suppose a Cobb-
Douglas production function, then output Yt is given by  
3Historical data on these variables from 1949-1999 are available at www.bls.gov/mfp.
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where At is total factor productivity, Kt is capital services, and Nt is labor services.  In what
follows, we examine how regulation affects Y and also A, K, and N.  The capital stock, a
component of the capital services measure (as explained immediately below), moves very slowly
and with a great deal of persistence, which may make it difficult to uncover a relationship
between capital and regulation.  In contrast, the gross change in the capital stock - gross
investment - is much less persistent than the stock itself.  We therefore also examine the relation
between regulation and gross private domestic investment.
3.2. Data: Sources and Issues
The measure of regulatory activity R is the total page count of the CFR, discussed above. 
Real output in the private business sector (Y), private capital service flows (K), and hours of
labor services (N) are taken from the Monthly Labor Review.
3  Output Y is real output in the
private business sector, which is gross domestic product less output produced by the
government, private households, and non-profit institutions.  Capital K is service flows of
equipment, structures, inventories, and land, computed as a Tornqvist aggregate of capital stocks
using rental prices as weights.  Labor N is hours worked by all persons in the private business
sector, computed as a Tornqvist aggregate of hours of all persons using hourly compensation as
weights.  Total factor productivity (TFP) is the Solow residual from a Cobb-Douglas production
function assuming a capital share of thirty percent.  Gross private domestic investment (I) is
taken from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).  In addition, our regression
analysis includes two explanatory variables other than regulation: total government spending (G)
and the federal marginal tax rate on personal income (T).  Government spending is taken from7
NIPA.  The marginal tax rate is from Stephenson (1998) and includes both the personal income
tax and the Social Security tax.  Figures 2 and 3 show the time series for G and T.  All data are
annual observations for the U.S. over the period 1949 to 1999 except for marginal tax rates,
which end in 1995.
Phillips-Perron tests indicate that the logarithms of all variables except capital are
integrated order one, implying stationarity of growth rates but not levels.  Test results for capital
are somewhat anomalous, indicating that the logarithm of capital is integrated order two.  This
result implies that not only the level of capital but also its growth rate are non-stationary, which
is inconsistent with the result obtained for investment.  A simple calculus exercise shows that, in
steady state, the growth rate of any variable X equals the growth rate of its change dX/dt. 
Investment is the change in capital, so the growth rates of capital and investment should be the
same.  The growth rate of investment appears to be stationary, whereas the growth rate of capital
appears to be first-order integrated.  Economic theory suggests that capital, investment, and
output all should have the same order of integration; on a balanced growth path, their growth
rates all should be constant.  We therefore conduct our analysis of the difference-stationary
models under the assumption that the log of capital is integrated order one.  We have examined
the effect of  treating capital as integrated order two and found that the results were qualitatively
unchanged from those we report here.
3.3. Granger Causality Tests
We are not aware of any well-developed theory of how regulation and the macroeconomy
interact, so it seems prudent to begin our exploration with the completely non-structural method
of Granger causality tests (Feige and Pearce, 1979; Granger, 1969, 1988; Jacobi, Leamer, and8
Ward, 1979; Sims, 1972; Zellner, 1988).  These tests allow us to examine two questions at once. 
First, in the spirit of Hamilton’s (1983) pioneering study of oil and the macroeconomy, the tests
give direct evidence on the question of whether regulation plays any role in determining the
behavior of the macro variables of interest.  Second, the tests provide evidence on whether
regulation is endogenous or exogenous, an issue relevant to the structural estimation that we
pursue later.
The results of the bivariate Granger-causality tests between regulation and each of the
macroeconomic variables are reported in Table 1 for the period 1949-1999.   The tests are
conducted on the first-differences of the logs in order to have stationary variables.  In Table 1, y,
tfp, n, k, i, and r denote the logs of output, total factor productivity, labor, capital, investment,
and regulation, respectively.  The notation )r÷ / )x refers to the test that )r does not Granger-
cause )x.   Table 1 reports the results for a lag length of 4; results were similar for lag lengths of
3 or 5, with the exception of K, as we explain momentarily.  The tests indicate that regulation
Granger-causes Y, TFP, and I and that Y, TFP, and I do not Granger-cause regulation.  For K, the
results are the reverse: regulation does not Granger-cause K, but K does Granger-cause
regulation.  For N, there is no Granger-causality in either direction.  The results for K and I are
inconsistent.  Investment is the change in capital, so it seems reasonable to expect the same
causality results for K and I with respect to R.  We therefore explored using longer lags for both I
and K.  The causality results for I are unchanged by adding more lags; in contrast, the results for
K change.  Starting with six lags, the test results for K stabilize, showing no evidence of
causation running in either direction between R and K.  This result is more consistent with that
for I (showing that R causes I) but still not completely consistent.  Our interpretation is that the4We also performed Granger-causality tests on the individual titles of the CFR rather than
the aggregate measure.  Few of the individual areas of regulation Granger-cause any of the
macroeconomic variables considered here, but the whole set of titles is jointly significant.  With
nearly 50 individual titles and only 50 observations, the tests have few degrees of freedom,
leaving the results uninformative.  This problem with degrees of freedom arises again later when
we explore structural relations between regulation and macroeconomic variables.  We discuss it
in more detail there.
5Goff's (1996, Chapter 7) empirical analysis of the macroeconomic effects of regulation
amount to a limited form of Granger causality tests.  He estimates an ARMA model for each of
several macro variables and then adds a few lags of his factor analysis measure of regulation to
the model, effectively performing a test of whether regulation Granger-causes the dependent
variables.  He finds that regulation does cause the dependent variables.
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longer lags required for stable test results for K probably reflect the great persistence of K.  The
absence of Granger-causality from R to K even though there is causality from R to I probably
reflects the very small size of annual (net) investment relative to the capital stock.  In summary,
then, we have unidirectional causation running from regulation (R) to output (Y), total factor
productivity (TFP), and investment (I); and no causation in either direction between regulation
(R) on the one hand and labor (N) or capital (K) on the other.
4  These results have two important
implications.
First, the tests strongly suggest a relation between regulation and several macroeconomic
variables.  In studying the effect of oil and the macroeconomy, Hamilton (1983) concluded on
the basis of similar Granger causality tests that oil prices played a major role in causing
movements in US aggregate output.
5  If we were to stop here, we would draw a similar
conclusion about regulation.
Rather than stop here, however, we continue below with an examination of the structural
relation between regulation and the macroeconomy.   In doing that, the second implication of the
Granger causality tests is relevant, namely, that regulation is econometrically exogenous.  This10
strong result is very convenient because it means we do not have to worry about how to model
any simultaneity between regulation and our dependent variables, something for which there
would be essentially no theoretical basis.
We now turn to reduced-form regressions to explore in more detail the relations
suggested by our Granger causality tests.
3.4. Regression Models
Phillips-Peron tests indicate that all the series are non-stationary in levels, which is
consistent with the visual evidence that all the series have strong upward trends.  There is
considerable disagreement in the profession over how to interpret non-stationarity, with trend-
stationarity, trend-stationarity with trend breaks, difference stationarity, and fractional
integration all offered as plausible models (e.g., Nelson and Plosser, 1982; Murray and Nelson,
2000; Diebold and Inoue, 2001).  We therefore examine the two most widely-accepted models:
(1) linearly detrended with trend breaks and (2) first-differenced.  The current consensus seems
to favor trend-break models, so we give those more emphasis than the first-difference
alternatives.
3.4.A. Trend-Break Model.  The trend-break model allows government policy variables
including regulation to explain the breaks in the trend of the dependent variable as well as
movements about trend.  We start with a simple generic model to facilitate discussion of the
issues.  Let X be any macro variable of interest, and let Z be an exogenous explanatory variable
for X.  Consider the following simple trend-break model for X, explained momentarily:
(1)6That is, models of the form
.
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or, upon taking logarithms and putting the terms in the usual order,
(2)
where, as before, lower-case variables are the logs of the corresponding upper-case variables, ",
$, (j, *j, and Tj are constants, Ji are lag lengths, and U is a log-normally distributed residual.
In (1), the first term in parentheses is a trend term; the trend coefficient is a function of
regulation and relation squared, allowing regulation to cause breaks in trend.  The usual practice
in estimating models with trend breaks is to use an atheoretical time series approach of searching
for the breaks with a statistical procedure.  In contrast, the foregoing model takes a structural
approach, allowing regulation to be the cause of trend breaks.  This model nests within it the
simpler linearly detrended model with constant trend ((i = 0 and *j = 0 for all I and j).
6
The second large term in parentheses in (1) is appears to be purely an intercept term, but
in fact it, too, contains a trend element whose role must be understood.  Suppose Z obeys the law
of motion
where "Z and $Z are constants, with $Z being the trend in Z, and V is a log-normally distributed
residual.  Consider a macro variable X whose “own” trend is $ and whose “intercept” term
depends on current Z:12
where T and A/  are constants, U is a normally distributed residual, and W is the log-
normally distributed compound residual UV
T.  We see from the last line that the total trend in X
is $ + T$Z.  It is the estimate one would obtain for the trend by regressing the log of X on a
constant and time with Z omitted; it would be reported in the newspapers as the growth rate of X. 
Note, therefore, that it is not the trend in X that would result if Z were held constant; that would
be $, not $+T$Z.  In some of what follows, we will discuss counterfactual paths that would have
emerged if exogenous variables had been held constant.  Doing that requires distinguishing
among the quantities $, T$Z, and $+T$Z.
Applying these results to (1) leads to
(3)
The trend is B(Zt) = $ + $Z ETj + E(j Zt-J + E*j Zt-j
2, a quadratic function of Z.  The first term $ is
constant and captures trend elements apart from any effects of Z.  The last three terms collect the
various effects of Z.  In what follows, we refer to the first term $ as the trend-apart effect
(because it captures the trend that would be present if all the exogenous variables were7The U component of the compound residual can include any exogenous variable not
subject to analysis.  The trends in such variables are included in the trend-apart term $, so that U
captures the transient components.
13
trendless), the second term $ZETj as the trend-intercept effect of Z, the third term as the trend-
linear effect, and the fourth term as the trend-quadratic effect.  The trend-intercept effect is
constant.  At times, it is convenient to keep it separate from the trend-apart effect, which also is
constant; at other times, it is convenient to group the two together.  In the second line of (3), the
term in large parentheses is the detrended intercept of X, consisting of two parts.  The first part is
the constant,  , and the second part is the compound residual, U(AV
T).  Because X is trend-
stationary, the compound residual is purely transient, causing fluctuations about trend.  We refer
to this transient as the cycle effect.
7
In this model, an exogenous variable Z can have two types of permanent effects on an
endogenous variable X.  First, a permanent change in the level of Z permanently alters the level
of X if the sum of the Ti coefficients differs from zero.  Second, a permanent change in the level
of Z alters the trend in X if any of the (i or *i coefficients differ from zero; this alteration is
permanent if the sums of the (i or *i coefficients differ from zero.
3.4.B. Difference-Stationary Model.  As an alternative to the foregoing trend-break model, we
examine a difference-stationary ARMAX of the form:
(4)
where the first term in parentheses is the drift, a quadratic function of the exogenous variable Z. 
In light of the discussion of the trend-break model, the meaning of the terms in this difference-
stationary model is straightforward and requires no further discussion.14
3.5. Estimation Results.
For both models, we examine the sensitivity of our endogenous macro variables to three
policy variables: regulation R, the average marginal tax rate T, and government purchases G. 
We have not pursued the possibility of decomposing G into major parts (such as federal versus
state and local, or national defense versus road building), even though different kinds of
expenditure almost certainly have different effects on the economy and may interact with
regulation in different ways.  Similarly, we ignore government debt, which is harmless in any
case if Ricardian equivalence holds.
3.5.A. Trend-Break Model.  The equation to be estimated is
(5)
This form corresponds to equation (1), where the trends in the exogenous variables remain
impounded in the variables themselves (that is, the trend-intercept terms do not appear in the
trend expression inside the first set of parentheses).  It turns out that T and G affect only









T all are zero.)  To simplify notation, we therefore write the estimating equation as
(6) .
Taking logs gives8We tried two other estimation methods.  Instead of using a Newey-West correction, we
estimated subject to the following ARMA model for ut:
where e is white noise.  The results were essentially the same as those with the Newey-West
correction.  We also tried choosing lag lengths by dropping lag terms until we arrived at one that
was individually significant.  Again, the main conclusions were unchanged.
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(7)
which is the equation actually estimated.
Table 2 reports the estimation results for the five macro variables of interest.  Part I of
Table 2 reports estimates for all parameters pertaining to regulation; Part II reports all other
parameter estimates.  The lag lengths Jx were chosen by imposing a large initial value and
searching over all possible smaller values to find that which minimized the Schwarz information
criterion.  The residuals were serially correlated, so we used a Newey-West correction.
8  We
focus our attention on Part I of Table 2 because regulation is the object of study.
Regulation has significant but different effects on all five dependent macro variables. 
Regulation affects the trend of all five variables in some way, and it has cycle effects on all
variables except TFP.  These effects enter with distributed lags, implying that changes in
regulation cause non-trivial dynamic responses in the dependent variables.  Also, the number of
terms in the lags and the coefficient magnitudes and signs differ across dependent variables,
indicating that regulation has compositional effects, altering not only the level of aggregate
output but also the way in which it is produced.  Table 4 collects the effects of regulation in
summary form for easy reference.  We now examine these effects in more detail.
3.5.A.1: Trend.  As we have seen above, regulation can have two kinds of effects on a dependent16
variable’s trend: a permanent shift in the trend (the trend-intercept effect) and breaks in trend
(the trend-linear and trend-quadratic effects).  Our results indicate that regulation has both kinds
of effects on all variables except TFP, which does not show any trend-intercept effect.  For
simplicity, we will concentrate discussion on the results for output and note differences with
other dependent variables when they are significant.
The trend-intercept effect is the product of regulation’s trend $R and the sum of the Tj
R
coefficients.  The latter are reported toward the bottom of Part I of Table 2; $R is obtained by
estimating the equation
The estimated value of $R is reported in Table 3, along with analogous estimates for G and T. 
For output, the sum of the Tj coefficients is -0.151, and $R is 0.0339.  Their product is -0.0051
(see the last line of Table 2, Part I), indicating that regulation shifts the trend in output down by
almost exactly half a percentage point.  This shift, being a reduction in the intercept of the trend
coefficient function B(Rt), is uniform over time.  In addition, regulation has time-varying effects
on output's trend through the trend-linear and trend-quadratic terms of the coefficient function
B(Rt).  The linear coefficient is positive, and the quadratic coefficient is negative, causing
output's trend initially to increase but then eventually to fall as regulation grows.
We can determine the effect of post-1949 regulation on the dependent macro variables'
trends easily enough by using the parameter estimates and the regulation data to evaluate the
trend-intercept, trend-linear, and trend-quadratic terms and then adding them together.  That is,




2, which is the change in output's
trend caused by regulations added since 1949.  The result is shown in Figure 4.  The trend-17
intercept effect of -0.005 means that the entire path shown in Figure 4 is shifted down half a
percentage point compared to what it would have been in the absence of new regulation.  The
trend grows from 1949 to 1978, reflecting the dominance of the trend-linear term for low values
of R.  The trend then falls from 1978 to 1999, reflecting the dominance of the trend-quadratic
term for high values of R.  Almost the entire path is in the negative region, indicating that
regulation reduced output's trend over most of the sample.
The same method can be applied to the other dependent variables to determine
regulation's effect on their trends.  Figures 5-8 show the results.  The differences among them
and also between them and Figure 4 are striking.  Regulation over the past fifty years not only
has reduced the trend in output but also has reduced the growth rate of TFP and raised the
growth rates of capital and labor.  Apparently, regulation has reduced the growth in economic
efficiency (TFP) and induced a trend toward substitution of physical inputs for mental inputs as a
partial offset.
Regulation also has reduced the trend in investment.  The level of investment is closely
related to the trend in physical capital (capital's trend, or growth rate, is investment divided by
capital), so the trend in investment is closely related to the change in the trend in capital.  As we
shall see momentarily, regulation has raised the level of investment through another channel,
which is consistent with our finding that regulation has lifted the trend in capital.  The decline in
investment's trend, shown in Figure 8, corresponds to the decline in the slope of capital's trend,
which explains the concavity of the time path of capital's trend in Figure 7.
3.5.A.2. Cycle (or Level) Effects.  Regulation affects not only trend but also causes fluctuation
about trend and one-time shifts in levels.  These effects are captured by the Tj
R coefficients.  For18
output, the first three Tj
R coefficients are statistically significant, indicating that current, once-
lagged, and twice-lagged regulation affect fluctuations about trend.  Note that statistical
significance here is determined by minimization of the Schwarz-Bayes information criterion
(SBC) and therefore is joint significance.  Indeed, the second Tj
R coefficient is individually
insignificant, but eliminating it raises the SBC.  The individual Tj
R coefficients are of mixed
sign, but their sum is negative, indicating that a permanent change in the level of regulation has a
net negative effect on the level of output.  In graphical terms, the time path of output ultimately
is shifted downward by an increase in regulation, independently of any effect on trend.  The
standard error on the sum of the Tj
R is a bit large, leading to some imprecision of the estimated
sum, but the point estimate indicates a non-trivial elasticity of output's level with respect to
regulation of about -15 percent.
That regulation affects output with a distributed lag means that regulation has dynamic
effects on output.  An interesting aspect of the dynamic path is that output's response to
regulation changes sign over time.  Initially, output responds positively to regulation (T0
R > 0)
but later reverses direction (T1
R, T2
R < 0) and ultimately responds negatively (ETj
R < 0).
The response of the other variables' levels is mostly similar to that of output.  The notable
exception is the net positive response of investment to regulation; the sum of the Tj
R is positive
for I.  Figure 9 shows the cycle effect on investment of regulations added since 1949.  The large
upward jump in the early 1970s corresponds to the introduction of extensive environmental and
occupational health and safety regulation, both of which required large investments by firms.
We see, then, that regulation has permanent effects on the various dependent macro
variables through alterations in trend and shifts in levels, and it also has transitory cyclical19
effects.  In addition, the differing coefficient magnitudes, coefficient signs, and lag lengths of the
responses of TFP, N, and K to regulation indicate that regulation has allocative effects.  The
economy responds to regulation not only by changing the amount of output produced but also by
changing the way it produces that output.
3.5.A.3. The Productivity Slowdown of the 1970s.  Our results suggest a straightforward
explanation for the productivity slowdown of the 1970s and 1980s: regulation and taxes.  Figures
10 and 11 show the level and growth rate of TFP over the sample period.  The solid lines depict
the raw data; the dashed lines are the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered series.  It is clear from the
two figures that TFP growth starts falling sometime in the mid to late 1960s, stops falling around
1981, and perhaps regains some of its former vigor after that.  Figure 1 shows that regulation's
growth increased dramatically around 1971 (reflecting the new environmental and occupational
safety regulations), and Figure 3 shows that the marginal tax rate's growth rate abruptly
increased a few years earlier, around 1965.  Furthermore, tax rates stopped rising around 1980
and fell somewhat afterward, and regulation stabilized and perhaps even fell over the 1990s. 
The graphs show that major changes in the paths of regulation and taxes correspond the major
changes in the path of TFP.
We can do better than an impressionistic visual analysis by using our parameter estimates
to calculate the effect on TFP of regulations added since 1949.  For TFP, the estimated version of
equation (6) is
(8) .
What we want to calculate are the effects of changes in regulations and tax rates after 1949.  We
therefore rewrite (8) as20
(9)
where Wt collects all elements of Xt not due to post-1949 regulations or marginal tax rates. 
Figures 12 plots the time path of the first term in (9), which is the effect of post-1949 regulation
on TFP.   That term gradually falls from 1949 to 1973 and then turns sharply downward,
plummeting from 0.93 in 1973 to 0.62 in 1995, after which it nearly stabilizes.  Figure 13 plots
the time path of the second term in (9), which is the effect of post-1949 changes in the marginal
tax rate.  Judging from the HP filtered series, the tax effect takes an abrupt turn downward in
about 1965 and bottoms out in 1982, after which it partially reverses.  The two effects together
have an enormous impact on TFP.  In 1982, the regulatory effect has a value of 0.79, meaning
that post-1949 regulation had reduced TFP to 79 percent of what it would have been if those
additional regulations had not been enacted.  In that same year, the marginal tax rate effect has a
value of 0.92, meaning that TFP was 92 percent of what it would have been had marginal tax
rates remained at their 1949 level.  By 1995, the marginal tax rate effect had risen slightly to
0.94, but the regulation effect had fallen still farther to 0.62.  The small upward kinks in the HP
filtered series for DlogT in 1982 and 1991 suggest that the reduction in marginal tax rates in the
early 1980s and the stabilization of regulation in the early 1990s allowed TFP growth to resume
somewhat.
This explanation for the TFP slowdown is quite different from that offered by
Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), who suggest that the TFP slowdown resulted somewhat9We cannot calculate the cost of total federal regulation because our data do not include
an observation when federal regulation did not exist.  Given the highly non-linear relation
between regulation and output, we are unwilling to extrapolate back to estimate the cost of all
federal regulation.  Initial levels of federal regulation may have increased rather than reduced
output by making the economy more efficient, protecting property rights, and so on.
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paradoxically from an improvement in technology that required a period of learning before it
could be used to full effect.  Their theory is quite a complicated story; in contrast, our story is
quite straightforward: heavy regulation and high marginal tax rates reduced returns to knowledge
accumulation and so reduced the accumulation itself.  Greenwood and Yorukoglu's theory is in
no way incompatible with our proposed explanation; both could be operative.  The data,
however, almost certainly imply that Greenwood and Yorukoglu's theory cannot be the complete
explanation.  They base their theory on the large amount of investment expenditure on
information technology that began in the late 1970s.  The TFP slowdown, however, began about
a decade earlier; recall Figures 10 and 11.  That timing corresponds closely to changes in
regulation and marginal tax rates.  Our proposed explanation is at least as plausible as
Greenwood and Yorukoglu's on empirical grounds and is far simpler theoretically.
3.5.A.4. Opportunity Cost of Regulation.  We can calculate a measure of the output cost of
regulation added since 1949.
9  We compute what output's path would have been if regulation had
stayed at its 1949 level by evaluating (6) with estimated parameter values and holding regulation
fixed at its 1949 value of 19335 (that is, with Rt = 19335 for all t).  We then take the ratio of that
hypothetical path to the actual path of output.  The result is shown in Figure 14.  Values of the
ratio larger than 1 indicate years in which output would have been higher with the 1949 level of
regulation than with the level that actually prevailed in those years.  The ratio usually is above 1
and ends at a value of 1.099, meaning that in the last year of the sample (1999), real output10This 8 percent excludes the cost of tax compliance, which Crain and Hopkins included. 
We exclude tax compliance cost because taxes generally are not considered regulations.  Tax
compliance cost amounts to about one half of one percent of GDP.
22
would have been almost 10 percent higher if regulation had remained at the 1949 level.  This
difference is large in dollar terms.  The current GDP of the US is about $11 trillion, so if the
same 10 percent figure applies today, the annual output foregone because of post-1949
regulation is about $1.1 trillion.  That foregone output represents an opportunity cost of
regulation.  We can express it somewhat differently by noting that there are about 100 million
households in the US, so the additional regulation costs each household about $11,000 each year. 
Another way to put it, perhaps a little too dramatically, is that each page of federal regulation
today costs the economy about $9.2 million in foregone output.  Our estimates indicate that the
opportunity cost will grow at a rate of about 0.2 percent a year (the amount by which output's
trend was reduced in 1999), if regulation is merely kept at its 1999 level and not increased
further.  Two-tenths of a percent is an appreciable magnitude for a growth rate.
At its current size, the output opportunity cost of regulation is about the same size as the
direct compliance costs of regulation.  Crain and Hopkins (2001) estimate the cost of all federal
regulation (not just post-1949 regulation) to be about 8 percent of current GDP, or about $900
billion in 2003.
10  The output opportunity cost has not been previously considered in measures of
regulation's costs.  Including it more than doubles regulation's total cost.
Several aspects of the output opportunity cost are noteworthy.  First, our figures are net
costs.  They are based on the change in total product caused by regulation and so include positive
as well as negative effects.  Our results thus indicate that whatever positive effects regulation
may have on measured output are outweighed by the negative effects.  Second, the foregone23
output does not measure the total opportunity cost because, as we have seen, regulation has
increased employment and therefore reduced leisure, and because some current output may be
devoted to avoiding regulation and thus may not be inherently valuable.  Third, we make no
attempt to measure the non-production benefits of regulation and so offer no judgement on
whether regulation is a net social benefit.
3.5.B. Difference-Stationary Model.  The difference-stationary model is similar to the trend-
break model in that the exogenous policy variables affect the drift as well as the level of the
dependent variable:
(10)
The argument of the exponential function is the drift.  Taking logs gives the form of the equation
to be estimated:
(11) .
The policy variables Z enter in delta-log form in the standard way and also in level form through
the drift term.  As in the trend-break model, Z is the vector (R, G, T) and the coefficients (, *,
and T also are vectors.  Lag lengths were chosen by the same method as for the trend-break
regressions, by minimizing the Schwarz information criterion.
Table 5 summarizes the results for output; the results for the other dependent variables
are similar.  The coefficient patterns lead to the same conclusion as those in the trend-break
model: regulation affects )y through both the drift and the cycle components.  The main24
substantive difference between the difference-stationary and trend-break models is that the
marginal tax rate affects the drift rate in the difference-stationary model, whereas it did not affect
the trend in the trend-break model.  Unfortunately, two aspects of the difference-stationary
results seriously limit the usefulness of the model.  First, the number of jointly significant terms
is very large, making the estimated model unwieldy and also greatly reducing the degrees of
freedom.  Second, the individual parameter estimates are virtually all very imprecise (at least in
part because of the reduced the degrees of freedom).  Only one parameter out of thirty-eight has
a p-value less than 0.2 (and even that is barely less at 0.19), and only twelve of the thirty-eight
have p-values less than 0.5.  Imprecision of such magnitude  makes it impossible to perform
useful tests of whether subsets of the coefficients sum to zero; the standard error on the sum is
always so large that zero is included in any reasonable confidence interval.  Consequently, we
cannot say much about whether regulation has long-run effects on either the drift in y or in the
level of )y.  The same is true of government purchases and the marginal tax rate.  For the same
reason, we cannot construct useful counterfactual paths to estimate the magnitude of regulation's
effect on the path of output.  We therefore do not pursue the difference-stationary model further.
3.5. Disaggregagted Regulation
There is an interesting pattern in Figures 4-7.  Around 1972, the time paths of the trends
in Y, TFP, N, and K all show a sharp change in slope.  The 1970s were a time of major
innovation in environmental, health, and occupational safety regulations, which were different in
character from the regulations in existence up to that time.  Perhaps the new kinds of regulations
also had new kinds of impacts that explain the patterns in the time trends.  To explore that
possibility, we turn to an investigation of the effects of the individual titles of the CFR.11Note that disaggregation by title is not the same as disaggregation by industry affected,
nor does it necessarily capture all regulations of a general type.  “Agriculture” and “Animals and
Animal Products” are separate titles that both affect the agriculture industry.  “Banks and
Banking” is a title that may affect many industries.  For some purposes, it might be preferable to
measure some group of related regulations, such as all regulations pertaining to agriculture. 
Constructing such a measure requires some means of sorting regulations, a daunting task.
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Our goal was to isolate the CFR titles having significant impacts on our aggregate
dependent variables.
11  To do so, we regressed the five dependent variables on the set of page
counts for the individual titles instead of on the total page count of all titles taken together.  The
large number of titles leaves us too few degrees of freedom to include even one lag in the titles
or to include both level and trend effects.  We thus ran simplified regressions of the forms
and
for the trend-break case and 
and 
for the difference-stationary case, where w indexes the CFR titles.
In the trend-break case, for each variable a small subset of the titles had coefficients
individually significant at the 10 percent level or less.  However, a joint test of the remaining26
titles always strongly rejected the null that the remaining titles were jointly insignificant (p-
values of 0.000 in every case), implying that at least some of the individually insignificant titles
are in fact significant.  We thus could exclude no individual title and so could not identify which
individual titles were significant for any dependent variable.
In the difference-stationary regressions, for each dependent variable almost none (for
capital, literally none) of the titles was individually significant, and the null hypothesis that the
full set of titles were jointly insignificant never could be rejected.  These results contradict those
obtained for the aggregate measure of regulation, where total regulation had statistically
significant effects on all five macro variables.
The results are uninformative.  The trend-stationary regressions imply that individual
titles are significant but cannot identify which titles those are.  The difference-stationary
regressions imply that no titles are significant, contrary to the results obtained earlier for
regulation taken as a whole.  This general absence of information almost certainly is due to the
small number of degrees of freedom when all titles are included individually.  Low degrees of
freedom directly causes large standard errors of estimated coefficients, which in itself is
sufficient to prevent extraction of useful information about which titles are important; in
addition, low degrees of freedom also prevents inclusion of lagged regulation, which our
previous analysis found to be highly significant and whose exclusion therefore introduces biases
into the estimation.  We thus abandoned our inquiry into the effects of individual CFR titles.
4. Conclusion
We have presented a new time series measuring the extent of federal regulation in the27
United States.  We find that regulation has statistically and economically significant effects on
the time paths of output, total factor productivity, labor, physical capital, and investment. 
Regulation alters both trends and movements about trends.  The trend effects usually are
complex and non-linear.  The cycle effects have lag lengths and coefficient sign patterns that
differ across the dependent variables.  Regulation has allocative effects, changing the mix of
factors used to produce output.  Most striking, perhaps, is the uniformly negative impact on TFP,
which captures technical progress.  Our results suggest that federal regulation, together with
changes in marginal tax rates, may explain the famous and famously puzzling TFP slowdown of
the 1970s.
Regulation’s overall effect on output is negative and substantial.  In the trend-break
model, federal regulations added over the past fifty years have reduced real output by about 10
percent compared to what it would have been if regulation had remained at its 1949 level.  As a
result, annual output now ($11 trillion) is about nine-tenths of what it would have been ($ 12.1
trillion) if regulation had stayed at its 1949 level, implying an annual cost in 2003 of $1.1 trillion
in foregone output.  This opportunity cost is a dimension of regulatory cost not previously
measured.  Our estimate is roughly the same magnitude as standard estimates of the direct costs
of federal regulation and so doubles the estimated cost of federal regulation.   Furthermore, the
cost continues to grow at a rate of about two-tenths of a percent per year.
Regulation is a type of government activity heretofore omitted from macroeconomic
analysis.  Our findings suggest that omission should cease, both for the sake of better
understanding macro dynamics and for the sake of better estimating regulation's net benefit.28
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Null Hypothesis qN F p-value
)r÷ / )y 4 46 2.43 0.0652
)y÷ / )r 4 46 0.30 0.8763
)r÷ / )tfp 4 46 2.66 0.0480
)tfp÷ / )r 4 46 0.72 0.5840
)r÷ / )n 4 46 0.97 0.4372
)n÷ / )r 4 46 1.96 0.1206
)r÷ / )k 4 46 1.45 0.2364
)k÷ / )r 4 46 3.23 0.0226
)r÷ / )k 6 44 0.35 0.9031
)k÷ / )r 6 44 1.57 0.1888
)r÷ / )i 4 46 3.19 0.0240
)i÷ / )r 4 46 0.78 0.5481
Notes:  The variables are: r (regulation), y (output), tfp (total factor productivity), k
(physical capital), n (labor), i (private investment), where lower case letters denote the
natural logs of the variables in question.  ) is the first difference operator; q is the
number of lagged variables in the estimated equation; N is the number of observations.31
Table 2: Part I
Regulation Parameter Estimates
Trend-Break Models, 1949-1995

































































































































































of regulation: $R ETi
R
-0.0051 - -0.0014 -0.0071 -0.0014
Note: Numbers in parentheses (.) are Newey-West corrected standard errors; numbers in brackets [.] are p-values;
numbers in braces {.} are P
2 values.33
Table 2: Part II
Other Parameter Estimates and Fit Statistics
Trend-Break Models, 1949-1995


































































































































































of marginal tax rate:
$TETi
T
-0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0020 0.0003 -0.0033
Adj. R
2 0.998 0.992 0.992 1.000 0.977
Note: Numbers in parentheses (.) are Newey-West corrected standard errors; numbers in brackets [.] are p-values;
numbers in braces {.} are P
2 values.35
Table 3
Trends in Exogenous Variables
Variable Z     $Z
       (Standard error)
Regulation R  0.0339
(0.0016)
Government purchases G  0.0241
(0.0021)
Marginal tax rate T  0.0073
(0.0013)
Note: Numbers in parentheses (.) are Newey-west corrected standard errors.
Table 4
Trend-Break Models, Summary of Regulation Effects
Variable Regulation effects
Trend-intercept Trend-linear Trend-quadratic Cycle
Y Yes, < 0 Current, > 0 Current, > 0 Current and 2 lags,
sum < 0 but not
significantly so
TFP No Current and 1 lag,
sum < 0
No No
N Yes, < 0 Current and 1 lag, >
0
Current, < 0 Current and 1 lag,
sum < 0 but not
significantly so
K Yes, < 0 Current and 4 lags,
sum > 0
Current and 2 lags,
sum < 0
Current and 6 lags,
sum < 0
I Yes, < 0 Current, <0 No Current and 1 lag,
sum > 0 but not
significantly so36
Table 5
Summary of Difference-Stationary Model for Output, 1949-1995






Terms with p-value <
0.5
Drift function elements:
Constant $ One 0 0
Regulation (R) (
R Current & 7 lags 0 5
Regulation
2 *
R Current & 4 lags 1 2
Govt Purchases (G) (
G None 0 0
Govt Purchases
2 *
G None 0 0
Marginal tax rate (T) (
T Current & 3 lags 0 0
Marginal tax rate
2 *
T Current & 3 lags 0 0
Non-drift function elements:
)y 0 3 lags 0 2
)r T
R Current & 3 lags 0 1
)g T
G Current & 2 lags 0 0
)J T
T Current & 4 lags 0 2
e 2 1 lag 0 0
Adj. R
2 0.99637
       




Fig. 3: Marginal tax rate
over time
       
Fig. 4: Effect of R on Y
trend
Fig. 5: Effect of R on TFP
trend
Fig. 6: Effect of R on N
trend
       
Fig. 7: Effect of R on K
trend
Fig. 8: Effect of R on I
trend
Fig. 9: Cycle effect of R
on I
       
Fig. 10: TFP Fig. 11: DlogTFP Fig. 12: Effect of R on
TFP38
   
Fig. 13: Effect of T on
TFP
Fig. 14: Ratio of
hypothetical Y to actual Y  
12Throughout the appendix, the following citation format is used: volume or title number followed by name of
publication followed by page or section number.  For example, "49 Stat. 500" designates Volume 49 of the United
States Statutes at Large, page 500.  The following abbreviations are also used in the citations: USC for United
States Code, FR for Federal Register, and CFR for Code of Federal Regulations.
  
13The U.S. Statutes at Large and U.S. Code are comparable to the Federal Register and Code of Federal
Regulations, respectively, except that the former are primarily concerned with the publication and codification of
laws, whereas the later are concerned with transmitting to the public written requirements to be carried out and
enforced by government agencies (i.e., regulations).  Thus, the CFR is more appropriate than the U.S. Code as a
measure of regulation.
  
14No supplement was published for 1942.
  
15Due to the imminence of the second edition of the CFR, no supplement was issued for 1948.  Regulatory
changes published in the FR during 1948 were codified for the first time in the 1949 edition of the Code.
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Appendix: Code of Federal Regulations
1. History and Background of the Code of Federal Regulations
Before 1935, no systematic process existed for the promulgation of federal regulations; regulations were
simply typed and filed by individual agencies.  The lack of public notification regarding regulatory activity later
came to be known as "hip pocket" law, which led the government to embarrassment in Panama Refining Company v.
Ryan (293 U.S. 388, 1935), also known as the "Hot Oil Case."
12  The government's case, which was based on a
provision that was later nullified by a subsequent regulation, was dismissed by the Supreme Court, and both parties
in the case were impugned for their ignorance of the law.  This outcome led to the Federal Register Act of 1935 (49
Stat. 500; 44 USC Chapter 15), which established a consistent framework for codification of government regulations
throughout the rulemaking process.
The Federal Register (FR), first published on March 14, 1936, is a daily publication in which proposed
regulations appear first in draft form and eventually in final form, if passed into law.  The FR also contains
presidential proclamations, executive orders, announcements of agency hearings and meetings on regulatory issues,
grant application instructions and deadlines, official agency decisions and actions, and agency establishments,
reorganizations, and dissolutions.  Sometimes, there also are long sections containing technical or economic analyses
or discussion of issues arising during consideration of a proposed regulation.  The final regulations (newly passed
into law) contained in the FR ultimately are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).  Divided into 50
subject categories called titles, the structure of the CFR is similar, but not identical, to that of the United States Code. 
Currently, each title of the CFR is revised annually and contains all regulations in effect as of the cover date.
13
The first edition of the CFR published regulations in force as of June 1, 1938.  In the early years, the CFR
was not revised annually.  Instead, annual supplements carried in full text all changes and additions to the 1938
edition of the CFR as published in the FR.  The supplements covered the periods June 2-December 31, 1938 and
subsequent calendar years through 1941, listing regulatory changes promulgated during the period and in effect on
December 31 of the year in question.
14  The first revision of the CFR, scheduled for June 1, 1943 under the Federal
Register Act, was postponed because of the volume of rapidly changing regulations related to World War II and the
preoccupation of all government agencies with the war effort.  In its place, a cumulative supplement to the 1938
edition of the CFR compiled regulations in force as of June 1, 1943.  However, regulations in effect at that date
whose text was identical to that in the 1938 edition of the CFR are included only by reference to the original CFR. 
Also, emergency controls associated with the war period are recorded by tabulation rather than codification in the
cumulative supplement.  Thus, the cumulative supplement served as an adjunct to the original edition rather than a
replacement of it.  Following the cumulative supplement, annual supplements continued to update the 1938 edition
of the CFR for regulatory changes published in the FR during the remainder of 1943 and each calendar year through
1947.  The wartime suspension of the first revision of the CFR was terminated in 1948 and the second edition of the
CFR, recording regulations in effect on January 1, 1949, was issued.
15
Following the 1949 edition of the CFR, "pocket supplements" were used to record regulatory changes  
16The term "pocket supplement" derives from pockets which were made in the books of the 1949 edition of the
CFR for placement of the forthcoming supplements.
  
17On several occasions, an "added pocket part" (APP) was published instead of a pocket supplement.  The APP
served as an addition or supplement to the previous year's pocket supplement.  APPs were not cumulative unless
they appeared in consecutive years, in which case the old APP was replaced by the current APP as a supplement to
the most recent pocket supplement.
  
18Beginning with the 1973 revision of the CFR, the effective revision date of each title varies within the year
according to the following quarterly schedule: Titles 1-16 as of January 1; Titles 17-27 as of April 1; Titles 28-41
as of July 1; and Titles 42-50 as of October 1.
  
19Recall from the discussion above that the timing of revisions to the 1949 edition of the CFR varies across titles
between the years 1949 and 1969.
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published in the FR.
16  Pocket supplements differed from the annual supplements to the first edition of the CFR in
that they were cumulative; that is, the pocket supplement for a given year recorded the full text of all changes to the
1949 CFR in effect at the end of the given year, irrespective of the year that the change occurred.  The first pocket
supplement covered changes during the June 2 to December 31, 1949 period and subsequent pocket supplements
included any additional changes in effect at the end of each succeeding calendar year.  So, for example, the 1950
pocket supplement documents changes to the 1949 edition of the CFR that occurred between June 2, 1949 and
December 31, 1950.  Some of those changes occurred between June 2 and December 31 of 1949 and so already were
reported in the 1949 pocket supplement.  The 1950 pocket supplement repeats them and adds all changes that
occurred between January 1 and December 31 of 1950.
17
From time to time, as warranted by growth of the pocket supplements, individual titles (or individual parts
of a title) of the 1949 CFR were revised.  These revisions represented a complete codification of regulations in effect
as of December 31 of the year in which they were published.  The timing of revisions varied considerably across
titles.  In all titles, however, revisions became more frequent over time.  In 1950, for instance, only Parts 71-90 of
Title 49 (Transportation and Railroads) were revised.  In 1960, all or parts of Titles 1-5, 14, 18-20, 26, 27, 32, 40,
41, 49, and 50 were revised, and by 1968, all except Titles 34, 35, and 37 were revised.  Beginning in 1969, all titles
of the CFR have been revised annually.
18
2. Measuring Regulatory Activity Using the CFR
The consistent codification of federal regulations in the CFR since its inception in 1938 provides a unique
source of information on regulatory activity over the years.  Dawson (2000)  constructs series measuring  regulatory
activity based on the number of pages published in the CFR's various editions and supplements.  Although the
number of pages of regulation cannot capture the differential effects of alternative regulations on economic activity,
it affords new information on the temporal behavior of the total amount of regulation in place.  The remainder of this
section provides a summary of these CFR-based measures of regulation.  For a complete description of the
methodology used to construct the series and a statistical comparison of the various series, see Dawson (2000).
Before counting pages, we must standardize the pages in the CFR for different words per page across the
years.  That turns out to be almost effortless.  The CFR uses the same font and page size in all years except the very
first, 1938.  We converted 1938 pages to “standard” pages simply by multiplying by an adjustment factor based on
average words per page computed by sampling words per page in each title of the Code.  Even this adjustment turns
out to be irrelevant to our empirical work below because, for reasons to be explained momentarily, we started our
sample period in 1949, thus omitting the non-standard 1938 edition of the Code entirely.
Measuring regulatory activity using data on the number of pages in the CFR is straightforward in years
when the CFR is revised.  These include the years 1938, 1949, all years after 1969, and some years between 1949
and 1969.
19  Estimating total pages of regulation during the periods between the 1938, 1949, and subsequent
revisions is more problematic.  One approach, which explicitly uses all annual and pocket supplement data to
estimate total pages of regulation during years in which no revision is published, adds the number of pages in a
nonrevision-year's supplement to the number of pages in its corresponding complete CFR.  The series that results  
20Dawson (2000) discusses the “double-counting” problem in more detail and offers some alternative methods for
constructing the regulatory series based on interpolation in the non-revision years.  The results of the analysis in this
paper are not sensitive to the construction method, thus we restrict attention to the series discussed here.
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from this methodology exhibits rapid growth in pages of regulation during most of the 1940s followed by a drastic
decline in 1949.  This behavior in part may reflect the increase in regulation associated with World War II and the
subsequent decrease following the war, but it also is likely to reflect in part an element of double counting that is, for
practical purposes, unavoidable with the supplements used to codify regulatory changes between the 1938 and 1949
revisions of the CFR.  The supplements print the entire text of any section of regulation that changed, even if only
one word was different.  Consequently, a page of text in a supplement may represent completely new text that was
not present in 1938 or may be almost entirely repetition of previously existing text.  The only way to avoid double
counting repeated text would be to read each reported change to determine how much of it was repetition, an
obviously impractical task.  Growth in the estimated pages of regulation resumes in the early 1950s and moderates
into the 1960s.  The same double counting problem exists after 1949 as before but is less severe because revised
volumes of the CFR were published intermittently between 1949 and 1969.  The frequency of these intermittent
updates increased as time passed, with almost the entire CFR being revised in 1968.  Consequently, the growth in the
CFR page count between 1949 and 1969 is much more likely to be a genuine phenomenon than is the pre-1949
growth.  Double-counting ceases to be an issue after 1968 because the entire CFR is published every year after that. 
Because the counting problems are much more severe before 1949 than after, we restrict attention in our study to the
period 1949-1999.
20  Also, because we are interested in the effects of regulation on the private economy, we exclude
from our page count all regulations in the first six titles, which pertain to the internal organization and operation of
the federal government itself.